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Abstract
The nature of moral action versus moral judgment has been extensively debated in numer-
ous disciplines. We introduce Virtual Reality (VR) moral paradigms examining the action
individuals take in a high emotionally arousing, direct action-focused, moral scenario. In
two studies involving qualitatively different populations, we found a greater endorsement of
utilitarian responses–killing one in order to save many others–when action was required in
moral virtual dilemmas compared to their judgment counterparts. Heart rate in virtual moral
dilemmas was significantly increased when compared to both judgment counterparts and
control virtual tasks. Our research suggests that moral action may be viewed as an inde-
pendent construct to moral judgment, with VR methods delivering new prospects for inves-
tigating and assessing moral behaviour.
Introduction
Life is full of examples of not “practicing what you preach” (e.g., [1]). Consider Shakespeare’s
Iago as the classic hypocrite; a modest character in public but an immoral character when
alone declaring that “I am not what I am” ([2], p. 7). Numerous examples of moral inconsisten-
cies can be found for individuals who demonstrate a disparity between how they say they will
act and how they actually act [3]. Despite the abundance of these real-life moral inconsisten-
cies, the relationship betweenmoral judgment and action remains unclear [4].
People’s moral judgments have been investigated using hypothetical moral dilemmas bor-
rowed from philosophy (e.g., [5]). The classic example is the “trolley problem” comprising
both the “footbridge” and “switch” dilemmas [6]. In the footbridge dilemma, when faced with
the prospect of pushing a large man off a bridge in order to stop an approaching trolley threat-
ening to kill five constructionworkers, the majority of people say that they would disapprove
of this harmful action. However, in the switch dilemma, when faced with the task of switching
a trolley’s direction to kill one worker instead of five, the majority of people will approve [5].
Dual-Process Models of Moral Judgment
In order to understand these differing responses to the footbridge and switch dilemmas, vari-
ous dual-system frameworks have been proposed [5, 7]. According to Greene, Sommerville [5],
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moral judgments are driven by distinct and sometimes competing processes. First, intuitive
emotional processing is thought to relate to “deontological” or non-utilitarian judgment, seek-
ing to promote rights and duties (i.e., refusing to endorse harmful actions). Second, controlled
cognitive processing is thought to relate to utilitarian judgment, seeking to maximise welfare
for the largest number of people. In Greene’s model, these responses are affected by the type of
dilemma. “Personal” dilemmas are those that cause another person(s) harm and this is not “a
deflectionof an existing threat onto a different party” ([8], p. 389). Dilemmas not meeting
these criteria are termed “impersonal”. Thus personal dilemmas, such as the footbridge
dilemma, are thought to trigger increased activity in brain areas associated with emotional pro-
cessing resulting in an immediate negative emotional response. In impersonal dilemmas, such
as the switch dilemma, an absence of this conflicting emotional response results in increased
activations in areas involved in working memory and couldmean that individuals revert to
utilitarianmode [5]. In terms of the dualism proposed in Greene’s model, research suggests
that the arbitrary division of cognition and emotion can be somewhat artificial [8] and is far
from straightforward.
In an attempt to remove this distinction, Cushman [7] proposed a second dual-process
framework in his action, outcome and value model. Concepts of model-based and model-free
reinforcement learning are incorporated to offer insights into moral decisionmaking. This
model distinguishes between a process that assigns value to actions (e.g., pushing the man off
the bridge) and a process that assigns value to the outcome instead (e.g., causing the man severe
harm). Cushman argues that both processes involve emotional and cognitive elements and are
not mutually exclusive. The switch dilemma is processed by a model-based system which
favours saving lives (outcome-based value). Whereas the footbridge dilemma is more complex,
involving a model-free system which assigns negative value to the act of pushing (action-based
value) as this typically leads to negative outcomes.
Moral Actions in “Virtual Reality”
Whilst there is strong evidence to support dual-system frameworks of moral judgment [5, 9–
11], little research has attempted to understand the relationship between theoretical moral
judgments and moral actions [12]. Does refusing to push the man off the footbridge reflect a
theoretical or normative decision, or does it reflect a behavioural decision; “would someone . . .
actually resort to this course of action when the full repertoire of contextual features comes
into play?” ([12], p. 95).
Attempting to utilise Greene’s dual process model [5] in the framework of moral action,
Navarrete, McDonald [13] created the switch dilemma using Virtual Reality (VR). Virtual
actions were compared to hypothetical moral judgments and electrodermal activity was mea-
sured to assess arousal. In both the action and judgment conditions, the majority of people
endorsed utilitarian outcomes. Increased emotional arousal was found to be associated with a
decrease in utilitarian endorsements. This supports the theory that activations of emotional
systems are associated with non-utilitarianmoral judgments [5]. This, along with identical out-
comes of a further virtual study, supports the generalisation of Greene’s model to the context
of moral action [5, 14]. In contrast, Patil, Cogoni [12] found that utilitarian responses were
greater for impersonal dilemmas in VR than for their judgment counterparts. They argue that
Cushman’s model explains their findings; the saliency of the virtual environment meant that
the outcome-based value associated with not acting to save endangered victims had a stronger
negative value, than choosing to carry out a harmful action against one individual [12].
Although this VR research has provided the foundations for studying moral action in arousing
impersonal dilemmas, the incorporation of a personal dilemmamight offer insights into
Virtual Morality
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decision-making in emotionally conflicting situations [12, 13]. The current study aims to do
just that.
Moral Action as Distinct from Moral Judgment
Morality and action possibility have been linked in adaptive frameworks examining percep-
tions of morality and how this subsequently regulates social behaviours [15]. The predictive
element of morality is thought to play a subsequent role in social perception in aiding the iden-
tification of potentially beneficial or harmful group members [16]. For example, individual’s
expressing non-utilitarian values are perceived as more trustworthy and are subsequently pre-
ferred as partners in a social context [17]; demonstrating this adaptive function. Importantly,
this predictive quality is not limited to the physical environment as Iachini, Pagliaro [18] found
that moral and immoral descriptions of virtual avatars affected subsequent actions in VR. This
finding that moral judgments influence behavioural regulation raises an important distinction
in the present research; here we aim to examine the relationship betweenmoral judgment and
moral action rather than moral judgments and implications for action.
In this examination of the relationship betweenmoral judgment and moral action, it must
be considered that moral actions are driven by distinct mechanisms to those used for moral
judgments (e.g., [19, 20]). For example, in studies examining patients with psychopathy, under-
standing of moral norms remains intact, which disagrees with the immoral, anti-social acts
that these patients, in reality, often engage in [21, 22]. This also corresponds to the finding that
healthy individuals with high psychopathic traits and low Honesty-Humility endorse utilitar-
ian responses for action-choice questions (“Would you do it?”) but not judgment questions
(“Is it morally acceptable?”) (e.g., [20, 23]). It might be that deficits in psychopathic individuals’
empathy, more specifically Empathic Concern, results in this utilitarian trend [24]. In the vir-
tual study conducted by Navarrete, McDonald [13], the authors acknowledge that the role of
personality in this virtual moral action framework should be further investigated.
The Present Study
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to implement a personal dilemma (the footbridge
dilemma) in immersive VR. Furthermore, for the first time, we also address the question of
whether personality traits predict moral judgments and/or moral actions. In the present study,
moral actions refer to those simulated in virtual moral dilemmas as opposed to action-choice
questions which arguably remain self-reportedmoral judgments in nature [12].
Study 1
Study 1 aimed to explore the relationship between theoretical moral judgments and moral
actions to see whether they are associated or distinct using a personal moral dilemma. If
Greene’s dual-process theory applies to moral actions (e.g., [13]), we would expect individuals
to make as few utilitarian responses in VR as in hypothetical personal moral dilemmas [5]. On
the other hand, if Cushman’s dual-process model applies, as described by Patil, Cogoni [12],
we might expect stronger negative value to be assigned to outcomes in the virtual scenario,
leading to a greater number of utilitarian responses [7].
Study 1 also aimed to assess the role of personality traits, including trait psychopathy, in
predictingmoral judgments and/or moral actions. Given the evidence for a dissociation
between psychopaths’ responses to moral judgments and their actions in real-life [22], we theo-
rise that traits associated with Psychopathy such as low empathy and Honesty-Humility will
predict actions in VR (e.g., [20, 23]). Additionally, according to the findings of Tassy, Deruelle
Virtual Morality
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[20], we theorise that these traits will predict utilitarian responses for action-choice questions
(“Would you do it?”) but not judgment questions (“Is it morally acceptable to?”).
In Study 1, physiological arousal was measured in the form of heart rate response. Given the
novelty and visual saliency of VR, heart rate response was assessed in control tasks and also
experimental (moral) tasks to primarily examine whether arousal was triggered by modality or
moral context. Additionally, according to existing dual-process models of moral judgment [5]
and previous virtual paradigms assessing arousal [13], we might expect an increased heart rate
change to predict a non-utilitarian response.
Method
Participants
Forty participants comprising 35 females and 5 males, (Mage = 26.00, SD = 9.77 years, from 18 to
52 years) were recruited from the Plymouth University, School of Psychology, participant pool
and participated for course credit. Using G Power 3.1.9.2 with previous studies examining
moral judgments as a framework [12, 25], we determined a sample size of N = 40, with power at
0.80 and p = .05, as adequate. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The
majority of participants were right-handed (92.5%). This research received ethical approval from
Plymouth University Ethics Committee with written consent obtained from all individuals.
Personality measures
All participants were asked to complete an electronic questionnaire comprising three self-
report questionnaires:
The Levenson Psychopathy Scale (LSRP) [26] is a self-reportmeasure of Psychopathy
intended for research purposes. It has a two-factor structure assessing both primary (i.e., self-
ishness) (16 items; α = .81) and secondary psychopathic traits (i.e., impulsivity) (10 items; α =
.68) in non-institutionalised populations. The scale contains 26 items total, rated on a 4-point
Likert scale (from 1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree). The scale includes items such as
“For me, what’s right is whatever I can get away with”.
TheHexaco-IP-PR [27] is a personality inventory designed to assess six dimensions of per-
sonality. The inventory assesses the characteristics of Honesty-Humility (Items 10; α = .82),
Emotionality (Items 10; α = .85), Extraversion (Items 10; α = .67), Agreeableness (Items 10; α =
.82), Conscientiousness (Items 10; α = .80) and Openness to experience (Items 10; α = .84).
The inventory contains 60 items with responses given on a 5-point Likert scale (from 1 =
strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). The inventory contains items such as “I wouldn’t pre-
tend to like someone just to get that person to do favours for me”.
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) [28] is an inventory designed to measure dispositional
empathy. It contains four subscales to measure Perspective Taking, Empathic Concern, Personal
Distress, and Fantasy. The inventory contains 28 items with responses given on a 5-point Likert
scale (fromA =Does not describe me well to E =Describes me very well). The scale contains items
such as “I really get involved with the feelings of characters in a novel” (α = .80–.85).
Moral judgment and action measures
The study comprised two conditions to which participants were randomly allocated; a judg-
ment condition (N = 20) and an action condition (N = 20). In the action condition, participants
were first given a virtual control task that required them to push a virtual object in space after
hearing a tone. This task was included to ensure that increased arousal could be attributed to
the moral nature of the experimental scenario as opposed to the saliency of the virtual
Virtual Morality
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modality. The experimental task in the action condition was an audio-visual VR version of the
footbridge dilemma as described in Foot [6]. In the scenario, the participant viewed the scene
in first person view. The landscape in the virtual scenario was kept neutral with hills in the
background and a neutral “skybox” or representation of the sky was incorporated. Specifically,
participants stood on a footbridge with a large virtual human standing in front of them. Next, a
trolley car (modern train railcar) approached from behind and travelled towards five virtual
humans standing on the tracks in front of the participant (Fig 1). Participants had to decide
whether they wanted to push the large person off the bridge to stop the trolley car’s progress or
to allow the trolley car to continue and kill the five people standing on the tracks. Both the con-
trol task and experimental task were programmed in JavaScript within a Unity 3D game soft-
ware environment. Verbal instructions played during the 3D scenario and specific instructions
were given prior to the experimental task, explaining that this task involved a joystick but that
participants would be given a choice about whether they wanted to interact with the virtual
object or not. The VR dilemma began with a 30 second period of ambient noise and no verbal
instructions to allow the participants to familiarise themselves with the virtual environment.
After 30 seconds, verbal instructions informed participants that a trolley car was approaching
(“Look behind you, a train is coming.”). After a further 25 seconds, a second verbal dialogue
then followed (“Hey I am too far away but if you want to save the people you could push the
large person on to the tracks and derail the train. If you’re going to push him, do it now, but it is
your choice.”). Participants were then given a maximum of ten seconds to respond to the
Fig 1. Stereoscopic image showing a scene from the footbridge virtual dilemma through Oculus Rift head-mounted display. The image is taken
from the perspective of the agent at the end of the scenario in which the trolley car is about to collide with five virtual avatars standing on the tracks below.
Participants are able to rotate in the virtual environment with voice commands included to ensure full understanding of the events being played out.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164374.g001
Virtual Morality
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dilemma by either pushing the man with the joystick or by choosing to do nothing. The
response time was selected based on that adopted in previous virtual paradigms [12]. As the
trolley car approached and at a marked time interval, the people on the tracks began to shout
for help. If the large person was pushed, he would also shout. The virtual environment also
included other salient features including the sound of the trolley car approaching. After the
trolley car had either collidedwith the large person’s body or with the people on the tracks, par-
ticipants were left in the virtual environment for a further five seconds to ensure that they had
seen and understood the consequences of their actions.
In the judgment condition, participants were given vignettes describing the footbridge
dilemma [6] embedded in a further nine distractermoral dilemmas. These moral dilemmaswere
selected from those originally used in Greene, Sommerville [5] and were presented electronically
in a random order. In the final section of each dilemma, participants were asked (“Is it morally
acceptable to [specific to the scenario]?”). After a response was given, a second action-choice ques-
tion was displayed asking (“Would you do it?”). Participants were given ten seconds to respond
to each questionmatching the response time given in the virtual dilemma. Participants
responded by selecting “Yes” (Y) or “No” (N). Responses and response times were recorded.
Physiological Measures
Heart rate was recorded using a Cateye PL-6000 heart rate monitor in both conditions before
and after control and experimental tasks. This provided a means of examining arousal [12, 13].
The ear lobe clip was attached before participants began the electronic questionnaire to ensure
that the device was working and to ensure that participants could adjust to the set-up. The rate
of heart rate change (bpm) is not stable and can be either gradual or abrupt. As such, heart rate
readings were taken at onset and offset of the current task. The duration of time between onset
and offset heart rate readings was dependent on task type and for the judgment tasks, deter-
mined by self-paced reading speed.
In the action condition, heart rate readings were taken at the onset and offset of the VR con-
trol task. The onset was defined as the moment in which the VR task started. Offset was defined
as the moment when the VR task automatically stopped after participants had pushed the
object. This task was self-paced.Heart rate readings were also taken at the onset of the experi-
mental task (when the VR task started) and at the offset, which was defined as five seconds
after the temporal events in the virtual scenario had played out (i.e., the train had collidedwith
the large person or the five people on the tracks). The time between onset heart rate and offset
heart rate was 90 seconds. Heart rate sampling was done to assess whether changes in arousal
were a result of the moral dilemma itself rather than the novelty of being in VR.
In the judgment condition, heart rate measurements were taken at the onset and offset of
the control trial. In the judgment condition, the length of the task was self-paced as a result of
individual reading speeds. In the experimental trials, heart rate readings were taken on presen-
tation of the first text section of the footbridge dilemma (onset) and after participants had
responded to the dilemma (offset). Heart rate change was subsequently calculated for the con-
trol task and for the footbridge dilemma specifically.
Procedure
All participants first completed the electronic questionnaires before being randomly allocated
to one of the two conditions. In the judgment condition, all scenarios were presented on a com-
puter running E-prime software. In the action condition, participants first completed an elec-
tronic pre-questionnaire assessing their gaming experience (hours per week of video game play
and number of games played annually). For the moral task, a single scenario was presented via
Virtual Morality
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the Oculus Rift head-mounted display which was setup using the Oculus SDK 1 development
kit. The Oculus Rift is a head mounted VR system that provides an immersive, motion tracked,
3-D experience. The device uses a 7-inch screen with a colour depth of 24 bits per pixel gener-
ating a VR environment with a wide field of view (110° diagonal) and resolution of 1280 x 800
pixels (640 x 800 per eye). Head orientation tracking is enabled via a head tracker which runs
at 250 Hz. During the task, the participants also wore a pair of Sennheiser headphones and
interacted with the scene using a joystick.
Results
Pre-questionnaire responses
For the action condition, endorsing a utilitarian outcome and pushing the man in VR was not
associated with prior gaming experience (ps>.11).
Moral responses
First, we compared responses from the footbridgemoral dilemma in the text-based judgment
condition with those from the virtual action condition. In the judgment condition, when asked
if the action was morally acceptable, 20% of participants endorsed a utilitarian response (i.e.,
judge that they regard pushing the man as morally acceptable). In the action condition, 70% of
participants endorsed a utilitarian response, significantlymore than in the judgment condition,
(χ2(1) = 10.10, p = .001). The odds of participants endorsing a utilitarian response were 9.33
times higher in the action condition than in the judgment condition.When asked if they would
perform the action (action-choice question) in the judgment condition, 10% of participants
endorsed a utilitarian response to the footbridge dilemma, compared to the 70% who endorsed
the action in the virtual dilemma, (χ2(1) = 15.00, p< .001) (Fig 2). This is consistent with Patil
et al’s account of Cushman’s theory [12] and its application in VR; visual saliency highlights
the negative outcome associated with inaction and this begins to outweigh the negativity asso-
ciated with the action itself.
In the judgment condition for the text-based version of the footbridge dilemma, no signifi-
cant difference was found when comparing responses to the judgment question (i.e., moral
acceptability) and the action-choice question (i.e., whether they would do it), (p = .625).
Heart rate analyses
In both the judgment and action conditions, heart rate change was computed by calculating
the difference between heart rate readings (bpm) taken at the onset of the task and heart rate
(bpm) taken at the offset of the task. Heart rate changes were computed for each participant in
the control task and in the experimental task of their assigned condition. These were averaged
to produce mean heart rate change for control and experimental tasks in each condition. In the
judgment condition, heart rate decreased during the control task (M= -2.45, SD = 4.19) and in
the experimental task (M = -0.45, SD = 1.79). In the action condition, heart rate decreased for
the control task (M = -3.95, SD = 3.75) but increased for the experimental task (M = 5.15,
SD = 5.84) (Fig 3).
We conducted a mixed ANOVA with task (control task; experimental task) as within-sub-
jects factor and condition (judgment, action) as the between-subjects factor. Analysis revealed
a main effect of task, (F(1, 38) = 41.51, p =< .001, ηp2 = .52) condition, (F(1, 38) = 4.28, p =
.045, ηp2 = .10) and a significant interaction of task x condition, (F(1, 38) = 16.99, p =< .001,
ηp
2 = .31). To further investigate this interaction, simple effects analyses were performed com-
paring heart rate change in control and experimental tasks in both conditions. In this case, a
Virtual Morality
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MANOVA was used to assess simple effects as it results in a smaller error term. This analysis
suggested that for the control task, heart rate changes were not significantly different between
judgment and action conditions, (F(1, 38) = 1.43, p = .240). However, for the experimental
task, analysis suggested that heart rate changes were significantly different between conditions,
(F(1, 38) = 16.80, p =< .001, ηp2 = .31). Specifically, in the action condition, heart rate changes
were significantly greater in the virtual experimental task than in the control task (F(1, 38) =
55.80, p =< .001, ηp2 = .60). These findings suggest that the modality of VR alone is not
responsible for increases in arousal but rather its interaction with moral content.
We assessed whether heart rate change was associated with an increase in utilitarian
responses in logistic regression models incorporating heart rate change and its interaction
effect with condition (judgment [judgment question, action-choice question], action). As
expected, the regression supported previous chi-square analyses (Fig 2) revealing a positive
relationship between condition (referencing action condition) and the odds of endorsing a
Fig 2. Responses (%) in the action condition and judgment condition in response to the footbridge dilemma. In the judgment
condition, participants were asked whether the action was morally acceptable and whether they would do it. A greater number of
utilitarian outcomes were endorsed in the action condition
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164374.g002
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utilitarian response. This was the case when using the judgment question (b = 2.23, Wald X2(1)
= 9.06, p = .003) and also the action-choice question (b = 3.05, Wald X2(1) = 11.68, p = .001).
However, the analysis revealed no significant relationship between heart rate changes and the
likelihoodof endorsing a utilitarian response in either condition (ps>.359). These findings fail
to support our secondary hypothesis that increased arousal might predict non-utilitarian
responses based on existing dual-process models.
Personality trait analyses
In order to assess any differences between personality traits across both the judgment and
action conditions, a one-way ANOVA was used to compare trait measures. No significant
Fig 3. Mean heart rate change (bpm) for control and experimental tasks in both the judgment and action conditions. Increased
heart rate was observed in the virtual moral dilemma. Error bars represent +- 1 SE
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164374.g003
Virtual Morality
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differences between the judgment and action conditions were found (all ps> .313), except for
Conscientiousness, (F(1, 38) = 4.25, p = .046, ηp2 = .10) which was higher in the action condi-
tion. Emotionality, (F (1, 38) = 3.84, p = .058) and Openness, (F(1, 38) = 3.63, p = .064) were
marginally significantly different between conditions (see Table 1).
First, in order to determine whether psychopathic traits predicted utilitarian responses as in
previous studies (e.g., [20]), we conducted univariate logistic regressions with condition (judg-
ment, action) as the selection variable, primary and secondaryPsychopathy as the continuous
predictors and response as the categorical outcome (non-utilitarian, utilitarian). In the judg-
ment condition, we analysed responses to both action-choice and judgment questions. For the
judgment condition, neither dimension of Psychopathy was a significant predictor of utilitar-
ian responses to each question (ps>.159). In the action condition, primary Psychopathy was a
marginally significant predictor of utilitarian responses, (b = 0.21, Wald X2(1) = 3.54, p = .060)
(see Table 2). This finding is consistent with previous findings and our hypothesis that anti-
Table 1. Means and standard deviations for LPS, HEXACO-PI-IR and IRI subscales.
Measure Subscale Condition
Judgment Action
M(SD) M(SD)
1. LPS
Primary 28.70(6.62) 28.70(5.36)
Secondary 21.60(4.52) 19.70(4.03)
2. HEXACO
H 3.58(0.73) 3.53(0.60)
Em 3.32(0.70) 3.74(0.67)
Ex 3.23(0.50) 3.37(0.51)
A 3.11(0.78) 3.03(0.65)
C 3.47(0.70)* 3.86(0.47)*
O 3.53(0.72) 3.11(0.67)
3. IRI
PT 19.45(5.29) 18.10(5.10)
EC 17.80(5.86) 19.15(5.63)
PD 11.35(5.11) 12.45(6.39)
FS 20.40(6.04) 21.35(3.95)
Note: H = Honesty-Humility, Em = Emotionality, Ex = Extraversion, A = Agreeableness, C = Conscientiousness, O = Openness to experience.
PT = Perspective Taking, EC = Empathic Concern, PD = Personal Distress, FS = Fantasy Seeking.
*p < .05
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164374.t001
Table 2. Logistic regression with primary Psychopathy as predictor.
95% CI for Odds Ratio
B (SE) Lower Odds Ratio Upper
Included
Constant -4.98 (3.09)
Psychopathy
Primary 0.21* (0.11) 0.99 1.23 1.53
Note: R2 = .18 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .20 (Cox & Snell), .28 (Nagelkerke). Model X2(1) = 4.38, p = .04.
*p = .06. (SE) = standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164374.t002
Virtual Morality
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social traits predict utilitarian responses (e.g., 20, 23). However, we fail to support the distinc-
tion between action-choice and judgment found in previous research [20].
Honesty-Humility, a trait negatively correlated with primary Psychopathy (r(40) = -.73, p<
.001), was found to be a significant negative predictor of utilitarian responses in a second uni-
variate logistic regression (including all HEXACO traits) in the action condition, (b = -2.53,
Wald X2(1) = 3.95, p = .047) (see Table 3). For the judgment condition, Honesty-Humility was
not a significant negative predictor of utilitarian responses (ps>.256).
The four components of empathy were not found to be significant predictors of response
type in the judgment condition (ps = .271) or the action condition (ps = .073).
Summary and Discussion
Study 1 found that participants endorsed the utilitarian response of pushing when action was
required in VR, but refused to endorse the same response when judgment was required in the
text-based counterpart. Heart rate change was primarily assessed to determine whether arousal
was triggered by modality or moral content. In the present study, heart rate change was highest
in the action condition when participants completed the virtual moral task while there was no
difference between groups in arousal in the control tasks. This suggests that the VR modality
alone was not responsible for this increased arousal. Subsequent analysis found that heart rate
change did not predict moral responses in either condition. However it is important to note
that arousal responses in the present action paradigmwere assessed not only across the
moment of decision-making as in previous research [13] but also during the time in which par-
ticipants witnessed the consequences of their actions (or omissions of action). This may explain
why arousal did not predict moral responses in the present study. Additionally, previous gam-
ing experience did not predict utilitarian responses in the action condition; this might suggest
that responses in the virtual moral dilemmawere not akin to those of a gaming environment.
As a secondary finding, primary Psychopathy was found to be a marginal predictor of the
endorsement of virtual action responses. Honesty-Humility was found to be a negative predic-
tor of this endorsement in the action condition only. This can be explained given the associa-
tion betweenHonesty-Humility and traits such as fairness and sincerity. These traits are
contrasted with those associated with the Dark Triad of personality (Psychopathy, Narcissism
and Machiavellianism) [29] giving it an inverse association with Psychopathy (e.g., [23]).
Although we found that empathy was not a significant predictor in either condition, it is likely
that this was due to its measurement of both cognitive and emotional empathy; cognitive
empathy remains intact in those individuals who display psychopathic traits [30].
In the present methodology, it could be argued that the incorporation of a joystick device in
the virtual moral dilemma compared to key-based responses in the text-based dilemmas
resulted in game-related affordance effects; the joystick itself may have primed pushing
Table 3. Logistic regression with Honesty-Humility as predictor.
95% CI for Odds Ratio
B (SE) Lower Odds Ratio Upper
Included
Constant -2.53 (1.27)
HEXACO
H 1.19* (0.67) 0.07 0.08 0.97
Note: H = Honesty-Humility. R2 = .25 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .26 (Cox & Snell), .37 (Nagelkerke). Model X2(1) = 6.01, p = .01.
*p = .05. (SE) = standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164374.t003
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responses. In order to inspect this further, a short follow-up study was carried out (Study 1.1).
Additionally, the nature of the sample in the current study constrains the reliability of these
results. The present sample was limited in several ways comprising undergraduate psychology
students (M= 26.00 years old, SD = 9.77 years, 35 females). Thus in Study 2, we aimed to repli-
cate the existingmethodologybut with a qualitatively different sample.
Study 1.1
This follow-up study was designed to address possible influences of the inclusion of a joystick
device in the virtual personal moral dilemma described in Study 1.
Method
Participants
Forty participants (74.4% female, 25.6%male,Mage = 22.37, SD = 6.79) were recruited from the
Plymouth University, School of Psychology, participant pool and participated for course credit.
Moral judgment measures
The study comprised two conditions to which participants were randomly allocated; a joystick-
response condition (N = 20) and a key-response condition (N = 20). In both conditions, partic-
ipants were presented with ten personal text-basedmoral dilemmas taken from an existing
database including the footbridge dilemma [6]. In the final section of each dilemma, partici-
pants were asked (“Is it morally acceptable to [specific to the scenario]?”) followed by an action-
choice question (“Would you do it?”). Participants were given ten seconds to respond to each
question. In the key-response condition, participants responded using the key-responses
described in the judgment condition of the present research; by selecting “Yes” (Y) or “No”
(N). In the joystick-response condition, participants responded using a joystick; pushing for-
ward to elicit a “Yes” response and clicking a side button to elicit a “No” response. This setup
allowed a direct assessment of the potential affordance effects triggered by the inclusion of a
joystick device.
Procedure
In both conditions, moral dilemmas were presented in a random order on a computer running
e-prime software and participants responded using either the keyboard or joystick based on
condition assignment.
Results
Moral responses
The proportion of utilitarian responses was calculated for each participant across question
type. A mixed ANOVA with question type (judgment, action-choice) as within-subjects factor
and condition (key-response, joystick-response) as the between-subjects factor revealed no sig-
nificant differences between condition (p = .923), question (p = .472) and no interaction effect
(p = .295).
Summary and Discussion
This follow-up study found no significant effect of response device on moral decision-making.
As such, we found no reason to alter the joystick response option from the present virtual
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moral dilemma; the increase in utilitarian responses was not likely induced by game-related
affordance effects.
Study 2
In Study 1, convenience sampling of undergraduate students created a narrow database subse-
quently limiting the replicability of our findings. Study 2 was designed to address these sample
limitations. We examined the same research hypotheses as in Study 1 leaving all methodologi-
cal procedures identical. The personality variables included in this study were limited to pri-
mary Psychopathy (16 items; α = .72), secondaryPsychopathy (10 items; α = .43) and
Honesty-Humility (10 items; α = .76), as these were found to be associated with moral
responses in Study 1.
Method
Participants
Sixty two participants comprising 41 females and 21 males (Mage = 31.10 years old, SD = 15.54
years, 18 to 71 years) were recruited from the public in Plymouth, Devon (UK) and the sur-
rounding area using online advertisements. Participants were paid for their participation in the
study. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The majority of participants
were right-handed (81.7%). Two participants were excluded from the study as they failed to
complete the task due to lack of understanding. As such, 60 participants comprising 41 females
and 19 males (Mage = 30.05, SD = 14.55 years, 18 to 68 years) comprised the final sample. As in
Study 1, participants were randomly allocated to a judgment condition (N = 30) or an action
condition (N = 30).
Results
Pre-questionnaire responses
For the action condition, endorsing a utilitarian outcome and pushing the man in VR was not
associated with prior gaming experience (ps>.31).
Moral responses
First, we compared responses from the footbridgemoral dilemma in the theoretical judgment
condition with those from the virtual action condition. In the judgment condition, when asked
if the action was morally acceptable, 10% of participants endorsed a utilitarian response (i.e.,
judge that they regard pushing the man as morally acceptable). In the VR action condition,
63.3% of participants endorsed a utilitarian response, significantlymore than in the judgment
condition, (χ2(1) = 18.37, p< .001). The odds of participants endorsing a utilitarian response
were 15.55 times higher in the action condition than in the judgment condition.When asked if
they would perform the action (action-choice question) in the judgment condition, the same
responses were observedwith 10% of participants endorsing a utilitarian response to the hypo-
thetical footbridge dilemma, compared to the 63.3% who endorsed the action in the virtual
dilemma, (χ2(1) = 18.37, p< .001) (Fig 4). As in Study 1, this finding is consistent with our
hypothesis based on Patil et al’s research [12]; the visual saliency in VR emphasises the negative
outcome in the moral dilemma and this begins to outweigh the negative value assigned to the
action of pushing.
In the judgment condition for the text-based version of the footbridge dilemma, no signifi-
cant difference was found when comparing responses to the judgment question (i.e., moral
acceptability) and the action-choice question (i.e., whether they would do it), (p = 1.00).
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Heart rate analyses
In the judgment condition, heart rate decreased during the control task (M= -1.37, SD = 1.92)
and increased in the experimental task (M = 1.47, SD = 3.27). In the action condition, heart
rate decreased for the control task (M = -2.30, SD = 2.83) and also increased for the experimen-
tal task (M = 5.63, SD = 6.25) (Fig 5).
We conducted a mixed ANOVA with task (control task; experimental task) as within-sub-
jects factor and condition (judgment, action) as the between-subjects factor. Analysis revealed
a main effect of task, (F(1, 58) = 57.50, p =< .001, ηp2 = .50) condition, (F(1, 58) = 5.03, p =
.029, ηp2 = .08) and a significant interaction of task x condition, (F(1, 58) = 12.90, p = .001,
ηp
2 = .18). To further investigate this interaction, a MANOVA was carried out to assess simple
effects, comparing heart rate change in control and experimental tasks in both conditions.
Analysis suggested that heart rate changes were significantly greater in the experimental tasks
Fig 4. Responses (%) in the action condition and judgment condition in response to the footbridge dilemma in Study 2. In the
judgment condition, participants were asked whether the action was morally acceptable and whether they would do it. A greater
number of utilitarian outcomes were endorsed in the action condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164374.g004
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than in the control tasks in both the action condition (F(1, 58) = 62.43, p =< .001, ηp2 = .52)
and the judgment condition (F(1, 58) = 7.96, p = .007, ηp2 = .12). However, for the experimental
task, heart rate changes were significantly higher in the action condition compared to the judg-
ment condition, (F(1, 58) = 10.47, p = 002, ηp2 = .15). For the control task, heart rate changes
were not significantly different between the judgment and action conditions, (F(1, 58) = 2.23,
p = .140). As in Study 1, these findings suggest that increases in arousal are triggered by the
interaction betweenmodality and moral content.
As in Study 1, we assessed whether heart rate change was associated with an increase in util-
itarian responses in logistic regression models. As expected, the regression supported previous
chi-square analyses (Fig 4) revealing a positive relationship between condition (referencing
action condition) and the odds of endorsing a utilitarian response. This was the case when
referencing the judgment condition using the judgment question (b = 2.74, Wald X2(1) =
14.65, p< .001) and also the action-choice question (b = 2.74,Wald X2(1) = 14.65, p = .008).
Fig 5. Mean heart rate change (bpm) for control and experimental tasks in both the judgment and action conditions. Heart rate
change was significantly higher in the virtual moral dilemma. Error bars represent +- 1 SE
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164374.g005
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However, the analysis revealed no significant relationship between heart rate changes and the
likelihoodof endorsing a utilitarian response in either condition (ps>.088). Again, these find-
ings fail to support our secondary hypothesis that increased arousal might predict non-utilitar-
ian responses based on existing dual-process models.
Personality trait analyses
In order to assess any differences between personality traits across both the judgment and action
conditions, a one-way ANOVA was used to compare trait measures. A significant differencewas
found in both primary Psychopathy (F(1, 58) = 22.09, p< .001, ηp2 = .28) and secondaryPsy-
chopathy F(1, 58) = 7.55, p = .008, ηp2 = .12) between the action and judgment conditions; higher
primary Psychopathy (M = 37.07, SD = 3.75) and secondaryPsychopathy scores (M = 21.97,
SD = 2.94) were observed in the action condition compared to the judgment condition primary
Psychopathy score (M = 30.60, SD = 6.54) and secondaryPsychopathy score (M = 19.67,
SD = 3.52). No differences were found betweenHonesty-Humility scores (p = .529) (see Table 4).
As in Study 1, we conducted univariate logistic regressions with condition (judgment,
action) as the selection variable, Psychopathy subscales as the continuous predictors and
response as the categorical outcome (non-utilitarian, utilitarian). In the judgment condition,
we analysed responses to both action-choice and judgment questions. Psychopathy subscales
were not significant predictors of utilitarian responses in either the judgment condition for
both questions (ps>.802) or in the action condition (ps>.207).
Additionally, Honesty-Humility was not a significant negative predictor of utilitarian
responses in either the judgment condition for both questions (ps>.601) or in the action con-
dition (p = .787). Contrasting with Study 1, these findings fail to support our hypothesis that
antisocial traits and associated traits predict moral responses.
Summary and Discussion
Study 2 added support for the finding that participants endorse the utilitarian response of
pushing when action is required in VR but refuse to endorse the same response when judgment
is required in hypothetical text-based dilemmas. As in Study 1, heart rate significantly
increased for the virtual moral task in the action condition whereas no differences were found
between conditions in arousal in control tasks. As before, this indicates that the VR modality
alone was not responsible for increased levels of arousal. Subsequent analysis found that
arousal did not predict moral responses. As in Study 1, this may have been due to the heart rate
Table 4. Means and standard deviations for Psychopathy subscales and Honesty-Humility.
Measure Subscale Condition
Judgment Action
M(SD) M(SD)
2. LPS
Primary 30.60(6.54)** 37.07(3.75)**
Secondary 19.67(3.52)* 21.97(2.94)*
2. HEXACO
H 3.40(0.60) 3.50(0.62)
Note: H = Honesty-Humility.
*p < .05
** p < .001
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164374.t004
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sampling periodwhich incorporated the time in which participants witnessed the conse-
quences of their actions. Again, previous gaming experience did not predict utilitarian
responses in the action condition. Contrary to Study 1, Psychopathy and Honesty-Humility
were not found to predict moral actions in VR.
Discussion
The trolley problem has long offeredmoral philosophers and psychologists a way of comparing
utilitarian and deontological philosophies “in one neat little puzzle” ([31], p. 116). These text-
based dilemmas, whilst being ideal in their experimental simplicity, raise questions about
peripheral contextual features and their influence on moral decision-making [12]. Whilst
research has already addressed this shortcoming in virtual reconstructions of impersonal
moral dilemmas [12–14], these studies are the first to incorporate a virtual personal moral
dilemma.
Behavioural Responses
Overall, we found that participants behaved differently in judgment-based formulations and
action-based virtual formulations of the same moral dilemma. In both Studies 1 and 2, partici-
pants in the action condition, who responded to a virtual personal dilemma, endorsed a greater
proportion of utilitarian responses than those who responded to the same text-based dilemma.
At this early stage, our results appear to fall in line with the theory of Cushman regarding
outcome and action-based value representations [7]. Given the contextual saliency of the vir-
tual footbridge dilemma, outcome-based value representations for not pushing the man and
allowing the people on the tracks to be killed,might have had a greater negative value [7]. This
may have been greater than the action-basednegative value representation for pushing the
man to his death. Indeed, in Patil, Cogoni [12], the authors propose a similar theory in which
there may have been greater outcome-based value representations for not acting and allowing
individuals to be harmed, leading to a greater number of utilitarian responses. As adapted from
Patil, Cogoni [12], we suggest that the saliency in the present studies may have been generated
by the personal nature of the dilemma and the ability to see potential victims on the tracks. In
the text-based dilemmas, the absence of salient features and reliance on imaginationmight
have led to assignment of negative value to the action of harming as opposed to the outcome of
not acting [7]. This theory is tentative and requires further investigation. Future research
might consider incorporating eye-tracking software within virtual headset devices to measure
gaze durations for victims and non-victims; arguably this could indicate for which person(s)
there is greatest concern, although findings in this area are mixed [14, 32].
Emotional Arousal
Heart rate change was monitored in order to determine whether increases in emotional arousal
would be triggered by modality or moral content. In Study 2, both the moral text-based
dilemma and virtual moral task were more arousing than their control counterparts with the
virtual moral task eliciting the greatest increase in arousal overall. In Study 1, the virtual moral
task was more arousing than the control counterpart and also the moral text-based dilemma.
This suggests that the modality of VR alone was not responsible for changes in heart rate but
rather the moral nature of the virtual task.
Given previous theories regarding the association between non-utilitarian responses and
emotional arousal in personal moral dilemmas [5], we might expect an increase in heart rate to
predict non-utilitarian responses. Previous virtual studies have measured emotional arousal
and have yieldedmixed findings; whilst Navarrete, McDonald [13] found that autonomic
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arousal was negatively related to utilitarian responses in VR, Patil, Cogoni [12] found that
arousal was highest in virtual moral dilemmas and this correspondedwith a greater proportion
of utilitarian responses. In the present research, we also found an overall increase in emotional
arousal in the action conditions for the virtual moral dilemma but in both Study 1 and
Study 2, we did not find that heart rate changes directly predictedmoral responses in either
condition.
It is important to note here that heart rate change in the action condition also incorporated
the moment in which participants witnessed the consequences of their actions and as such
recorded arousal beyond the decision-makingprocess itself. The main purpose of arousal
assessment in the present research was to examine whether changes in arousal were as a result
of modality or moral content. Whilst the finding that arousal was greatest in the virtualmoral
task suggests that modality alone is not responsible for this increase, it is important to acknowl-
edge an additional explanation; witnessing consequences in the action conditionmay have led
to greater emotional arousal compared to imagining consequences in the judgment condition.
As a result of this and given that this research is the first to implement a personal moral
dilemma in VR, implications of these results for Greene’s dual process model remain unclear.
Personality Traits
In Study 1, we found that psychopathic traits marginally predicted and Honesty-Humility neg-
atively predicted utilitarian endorsements in the action condition in VR but not in the text-
based judgment condition. This might fall in line with previous research finding that psycho-
paths have distinct moral judgments and actions [21, 22]. More generally, it might give support
to the viewpoint that moral judgment and moral action remain dissociated. However, these
conclusions are given tentatively as Study 2 failed to support these findings. Importantly, in
Study 2, differences in Psychopathy scores prevented a robust follow-up of the findings from
Study 1. As such, further research examining the role of pro- and anti-social traits in these
action frameworks is required prior to further interpretation.
Alternative Interpretations
Whilst Cushman’s action, outcome and value model seems to offer a convincing interpretation
of these studies’ findings, there are alternative explanations in need of addressing.
Firstly, the potential interpretation that the increase in virtual utilitarian responses could be
a result of artificial gaming behaviours as opposed to moral-based decisionmaking is not sup-
ported in the present research. We found that decisionsmade in the virtual moral dilemma
were not influenced by previous gaming experience; as such, video game desensitization cannot
explain these findings. Additionally, we found no game-related affordance effects as a result of
the incorporation of a joystick device in Study 1.1 and as such, we argue that the increased utili-
tarian response pattern found in VR was not likely induced by this.
In terms of further differences between the modalities of the virtual moral dilemma and its
text-based counterpart, whilst we attempted to match the temporal nature of the paradigms, it
might be argued that salient auditory cues in the virtual dilemma resulted in the present out-
come. Specifically, in the virtual dilemma, the victims on the track began to yell at a fixed time
interval during the dilemmawhilst the man on the bridge did not yell until pushed; potentially
leading to the victims calling attention to themselves, whilst the man remained mute until after
the participant had responded. In an attempt to investigate this, we compared those individuals
who gave a utilitarian response prior to hearing the victims yell, to those who did after hearing
the victims yell. In Study 1, of the 70% of individuals that endorsed a utilitarian response, 7.1%
executed the action after the victims had begun to yell. In Study 2, of the 63.3% utilitarian
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responses, 16.6% elicited this response after hearing the victims yell. This indicates that in both
studies, the majority of participants in VR chose to push before the victims had called attention
to themselves. As such, the response patterns found in the virtual moral dilemma were not
likely triggered by these salient auditory cues.
Differences in auditory cues, with regards to instructions,must also be considered. In the
judgment condition, the text-based vignette explicitly draws equal attention to the acts of kill-
ing and saving; “the stranger will die if you do this, but the five workmen will be saved” [10]. In
the action condition however, the verbal instructions explicitly refer to saving; “. . .if you want
to save the people, you could push the large man. . .”. As such, it could be argued that the lack
of conflict created in the virtual scenario biased participants’ attention to the act of saving.
Despite this, we would argue that the visual saliency of the virtual scenariomakes the act of kill-
ing the man explicit; there is no reliance on imagination in the virtual scenario and the conse-
quences of your action (or omission of action) can be processed visually. Future research
should explore this potential bias further.
Importantly, with regards to the general criticisms of the ‘unreality’ of VR, previous research
has found that VR offers a platform in which sensitive topics can be studied in a more ecolog-
ically valid way; with individuals responding realistically in virtual paradigms (e.g., [33]).
Whilst we do not aim to predict real-life behaviours in these hypothetical moral dilemmas,
whether virtual or not, this action framework could offer insights into the immediate responses
experienced in emotionally aversive situations.
Finally, it might be that an alternative explanation for these studies’ findings rests in an
embodied-cognitionperspective of moral decision-making.The significance of this field to
moral emotion research has been extensive. For example, research has shown that the physical
experience of cleanliness [34] and feelings of disgust [35] can prime harsher moral judgments.
Importantly, this phenomenon appears to extend to concepts such as importance, with greater
physical exertion resulting in greater judgments of importance for example [36]. In this case,
perception of the physical consequences of actionmay have elicited learned experiences and
subsequently resulted in greater importance being assigned to action than when facing a more
abstract text-based dilemma. This embodied perspective should be investigated within future
virtual paradigms. This might be done by incorporating haptic feedbackwith varying resistance
or weight to see how moral decision-making is subsequently affected.
Methodological Considerations
Although we addressed the problem of excluding personal dilemmas in VR research [12], we
acknowledge the limitation of including a single virtual reconstruction of the footbridge
dilemma in the present research; as such, the generalizability of our results is limited in the
broader moral decision-making literature. However, given that previous virtual paradigms
have considered only impersonal moral dilemmas, this research has offered initial insights into
the immediate emotional responses prompted by a novel simulation of a personal moral
dilemma. Future research might consider constructingmultiple personal moral dilemmas in
VR in order to investigate further personal factors such as physical contact and spatial proxim-
ity in this action framework.
Additionally, given the increase in use of virtual simulation training paradigms across emer-
gency and healthcare services as a means of assessing emotionally conflicting decision-making
processes, future research should consider expanding the present virtual paradigms to include
life-like scenarios, extending the generalization of findings concerningmoral actions.
Despite these shortcomings, this research has provided initial headway in advancing the
moral domain beyond self-report assessments into behavioural decision paradigms.
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Conclusions
In summary, this research has demonstrated dissociation betweenmoral actions endorsed in a
virtual framework, and moral judgments endorsed in a traditional format. Importantly,
although in its initial stages, this VR technology has allowed us to investigate personal moral
dilemmas with greater ecological validity than traditional paradigms. This has opened opportu-
nities for the application of VRmethods in social psychology, allowing the examination of sen-
sitive issues in a way not previously possible.
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